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A Critique of Olfactory Objects
Ann-Sophie Barwich*
Cognitive Science Program, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, United States
Does the sense of smell involve the perception of odor objects? General discussion of 
perceptual objecthood centers on three criteria: stimulus representation, perceptual 
constancy, and figure-ground segregation. These criteria, derived from theories of vision, 
have been applied to olfaction in recent philosophical debates about psychology. An 
inherent problem with such framing of olfactory objecthood is that philosophers explicitly 
ignore the constitutive factors of the sensory systems that underpin the implementation 
of these criteria. The biological basis of odor coding is fundamentally different from the 
coding principles of the visual system. This article analyzes the three measures of 
perceptual objecthood against the biological background of the olfactory system. It 
contrasts the coding principles in olfaction with the visual system to show why these 
criteria of objecthood fail to be instantiated in odor perception. The argument demonstrates 
that olfaction affords perceptual categorization without the need to form odor objects.
Keywords: olfaction, perceptual objects, sensory coding, odor receptors, chemoreception, stimulus 
representation, perceptual constancy, figure-ground segregation
THEORIES OF PERCEPTION ≠ THEORIES OF VISION
Theories of perception suffer from one fundamental flaw: they are theories of vision. What 
gets routinely referred to as “the other senses” hardly played a role in general discussions 
about the nature of sensory perception, until recently. Systematic bias toward vision as the 
paradigm sense continues to shape both scientific and philosophical approaches to theories 
of perception to date. A simple example: in a recent Brain and Behavioral Sciences article, 
Firestone and Scholl (2016) contended that “Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating 
the evidence for ‘top-down’ effects.” Yet, the first sentence of the abstract reads: “What determines 
what we  see?” (emphasis added). Keller’s (2016) commentary to the lead article in the same 
issue pointed out that the central claim of Firestone and Scholl may not apply to other sensory 
modalities, especially olfaction. Olfaction is a strongly evaluative sense in which perception 
and judgment are deeply entangled. There is a solid rationale not to circumvent the specificities 
of olfaction and other forms of chemoreception when it comes to a comprehensive theory of 
the senses.
Olfaction challenges key philosophical assumptions about how perception works, starting 
with the concept of “perceptual object.” In the philosophy of perception, the notion of olfactory 
objects is principally discussed as distal stimulus representation (Lycan, 2000, 2014; Batty, 
2010a,b, 2013, 2014; Young, 2016; Millar, 2017). Perceptual objects, on this account, are either 
accurate or inaccurate mental representations of their physical causes. Nearly every philosopher 
here started with the understanding that olfactory objects refer to general qualitative categorizations 
that characterize a mental object, e.g., apple or skunk. Critics of this approach have pointed 
out that this conceptualization of olfactory objects, as representational of their sources, is 
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heavily visuocentric and ignores the particulars of odor perception 
(Barwich, 2014, 2018; Smith, 2015; Keller, 2017). Disagreement 
between the two camps mainly concerned the nature of odors 
as mental representations; specifically, to what extent the chemical 
stimulus counts as the decisive factor for what is an accurate 
perceptual representation in olfaction. Smith (2017b), p.  793, 
summarized the core issue: “The grouping of odors in olfactory 
perception reflects the behavioral needs and responses of 
individuals, not physical similarities among the stimuli.”
Despite increasing philosophical interest in the sense of 
smell, the notion of olfactory objects received little examination 
concerning its biochemical basis and neural underpinnings. 
Would a naturalistic account of olfaction require revision of 
its philosophical treatment? Other philosophers have already 
advanced biologically informed perspectives on perception, yet 
again primarily with focus on vision (Matthen, 2005; Chirimuuta, 
2015). As an example, Burge (2010) argued for a behavioral 
and evolutionary interpretation of perception concerning its 
purpose rather than accuracy. Olfactory scientists share this 
sentiment: “Recent research suggests that philosophical skepticism 
about the representational capacities of olfactory perception 
is a straw man, and more importantly, perhaps beside the 
point” (Castro and Seeley, 2014). Behavioral function, not 
idealized stimulus representation, characterizes olfactory 
perception: “Stimulus representation isn’t the primary business 
of olfaction. Rather, its job is solving a problem of valuation, 
rapidly encoding the biological salience of a stimulus and 
priming our multisensory representation of it to contextually 
appropriate action” (Castro and Seeley, 2014).
Nonetheless, these arguments do not challenge the underlying 
idea of perceptual objects as the starting point of the debate. 
Whether the notion of perceptual objecthood, traditionally 
framed by the workings of vision, applies to olfaction or requires 
revision needs examination. How fundamental is the idea of 
perceptual objects to theories of perception? Olfaction offers 
an excellent case to review the notion of perceptual objecthood 
and its role in theorizing about the senses against the backdrop 
of recent insights into the biological foundation of its 
perceptual processing.
This article examines the three criteria of perceptual 
objecthood in philosophical theories of smell: stimulus 
representation, perceptual constancy, and figure-ground 
segregation. The analysis shows that the traditional notion of 
perceptual objecthood does not apply to olfaction because the 
biological basis of odor coding is fundamentally different from 
the coding principles of the visual system. Perceptual objecthood 
is a concept used to analyze the identity of sensory input and 
especially its persistence and invariance. The identity of visual 
objects is contingent upon the sensory mechanisms that underpin 
feature extraction and integration. In olfaction, these mechanisms 
exhibit higher levels of variation, notably already at the periphery; 
so much so that the identity of olfactory sensations is shown 
to be inherently variable in its causal basis and does not comply 
with the idea of constancy in perceptual objecthood.
Specifically, Section “The Notion of Perceptual Objecthood 
and Its Explanatory Role” situates odors in recent philosophical 
debate on perceptual objecthood. Section “Three Criteria of 
Olfactory Objecthood” contrasts the coding principles in olfaction 
with vision to show that the three criteria of objecthood fail 
to be  instantiated in odor perception. Olfaction, the argument 
concludes, affords perceptual categorization (the grouping of 
perceptual features under a label) without the need to form 
odor objects as representations of source objects.
THE NOTION OF PERCEPTUAL 
OBJECTHOOD AND ITS  
EXPLANATORY ROLE
What constitutes a perceptual object and its explanatory centrality 
in theories of perception? Perceptual objects are routinely 
discussed under the premise of objectivity. Philosophical debate 
requires objectivity to demarcate the difference between 
appearance and reality in sensory perception. Scientific research 
is interested in objectivity to study the fundamental principles 
of sensory coding. Both are somewhat separate yet related 
endeavors that can be  subsumed under one question, raised 
by Gibson (1966) and highlighted by Marr (1982), p. 29: “How 
does one obtain constant perceptions in everyday life on the 
basis of continually changing sensations?”
This view frames perceptual stability as the central function 
of the senses. Perceptual stability was never the strong suit of 
olfaction. The sense of smell has been traditionally dismissed 
as being a fickle, subjective sensation in the past. Champions 
of olfactory objects thus aim to show that they can warrant the 
sameness of olfactory perceptions under varying perspectives and 
conditions of stimulus exposure, demarcating perceptual objects 
from noise or subjective divergence (Lycan, 2000; Batty, 2010a,b; 
Young, 2016; Millar, 2017).
Three criteria of objecthood are evoked in support of this 
position. The first criterion features the external properties to 
which perception, as an objective representation of the real 
world, relates: stimulus topology. Vision facilitates the 
representation of three-dimensional objects constructed from 
predictable surface reflections of light. Analogously, odor objects 
are viewed as percepts corresponding to the molecular properties 
of the olfactory stimulus.
The second criterion is perceptual constancy, referring to 
viewpoint-invariant processing of sensory information. This 
criterion sanctions stable conditions to recognize a physical 
stimulus as the same object across varying circumstances. For 
example, despite variables such as shifts in surface reflections 
and our own movement, we  identify visual objects across 
changing environmental conditions. This criterion is contingent 
upon the computational principles of the sensory system, 
extracting and integrating stimulus features into stable patterns. 
So the question to ask here is whether or how the organizational 
principles of the olfactory system facilitate perceptual constancy.
The third criterion of perceptual objecthood involves figure-
ground segregation. Visual objects are discernible from general 
scenery or background. The same applies to smell; odors are 
discernible in comparison with each other. Odor objects should 
also be  discernible with respect to their internal arrangement, 
i.e., as being composed of parts. How are these parts distinguished, 
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or connect to the overall object? In other words, what determines 
the boundaries of parts and wholes in the perception of 
odor objects?
In sum, the determination of olfactory objecthood rests on 
three conditions:
 1. stable representation of the physical stimulus as distinct 
perceptual classes,
 2. perceptual constancy as perspective invariance, and
 3. figure-ground segregation as whole-part discernibility.
These criteria were derived from general theories of perception 
originating in vision; in particular, representationalism (Lycan, 
1996; Tye, 1997) and Gestalt psychology (Koffka, 2013/1935; 
Millar, 2017). Representationalism suggests a computationally 
stable link that correlates mental images with stimulus features; 
while Gestalt psychology assumes the presence of general 
principles by which configural mental images emerge from 
basic components.
The olfactory pathway and its characteristics are noticeably 
absent in the discussion of these criteria, despite being 
fundamental to their computation. Instead, the mechanisms 
of odor perception remain unspecified, even excluded from 
the philosophical analysis of olfactory objecthood. Cooke and 
Myin (2011) called this the “Independence Thesis”: the assumption 
that the mechanisms of a sensory system may produce perceptual 
objects, but that the details of their processing can be  omitted 
in their study. So, even though olfaction shows physiological 
differences compared to other systems, perceptual analysis 
centers on percepts as the mental end products of their underlying 
biological processes. Whatever the biological details, what matters 
is access to their mental results. Therefore, the framing of 
objecthood builds on a stimulus-response model that blackboxes 
the system (Lycan, 1996; Young, 2016; Millar, 2017). That view 
is incorrect.
Odors are not unmediated perceptual expressions of chemical 
input because the isolated stimulus does not determine the 
content of its perception. Of course, the stimulus is a central 
element; yet, it is not the factor that determines what is 
perceived. That is the system that selects and filters features 
to be organized and integrated into sensory signals. This article 
shows that it is vital to understand how smell differs from 
vision (and, by extension, other senses). Other works have 
already pointed out that olfaction does not neatly fit the 
paradigm of vision, both in its perceptual and biological 
characteristics (Cooke and Myin, 2011; Barwich, 2014, 2016; 
Keller, 2017; Smith, 2017a,b). In one way or another, variations 
in the perception of smells constitute a measurable effect of 
the underlying causal processes (Wise et  al., 2000; Barwich, 
2014). The argument here details how biological differences 
in sensory processing mirror significant distinctions between 
olfaction and vision in their expression of perceptual content.
To set up comparative analysis of the olfactory system in 
the next section, a word on vision first. Traditionally, visual 
images have been modeled as the result of two separate 
subsystems: edge-detection and color. Here, edge-detection is 
responsible for the processing of spatial properties, where input 
signals from the retina are sent to the visual cortex via the 
thalamus to be hierarchically integrated into increasingly complex 
spatial detection-patterns such as lines, curves, and junctions 
(Hubel, 1988; Churchland, 1989). – Notably, the neural 
representation of edge-detection is topographic and stereotypic 
(i.e., the same in all members of a species). Later we  hear 
that this distinguishes vision from olfaction. – It is edge-
detection that usually is associated with visual object formation. 
Nonetheless, color vision is an integral part of this process, 
too. Older theories of perception considered color not to 
be  constitutive of visual object formation, but to “add” to it 
in a kind of “coloring in” fashion (Livingstone and Hubel, 
1988; comprehensive criticism of this model in Chirimuuta, 
2015). Meanwhile, recent research called the strict division of 
edge-detection and color vision in visual object formation into 
question. Neurophysiological findings showed overlap in both 
pathways, early on in the periphery (Gegenfurtner and Kiper, 
2003). Plus, color-coding is not only processing color but also 
resolving spatial features like edges (Mollon, 1989). Color is 
not merely contributing to but constitutive of visual object 
formation (Johnson et  al., 2001; Kingdom 2003; Gheorghiu 
and Kingdom, 2007). Indeed, it is fair to say that the principles 
of the visual system are not as settled as commonly stated either.
What is the basis to examine olfaction in relation to vision 
then? Olfactory coding cannot be  mapped one-to-one onto 
the characteristics of the visual pathway, and so analysis will 
engage with features of edge-detection and color vision to 
emphasize relevant differences with respect to overall perceptual 
integration. To compare perception in olfaction to vision thus 
must feature the coding processes that facilitate the identity 
and persistence of perceptual objects, regardless of whether 
these processes link to distinct, albeit overlapping, modules 
of a sensory system.
Overall, olfaction is highly susceptible to a number of causal 
factors: chemical, biological, and psychological. Setting up how 
these factors shape the perception of odors provides the 
background against which to evaluate the adequacy of the 
three philosophical criteria of objecthood in olfaction.
THREE CRITERIA OF OLFACTORY 
OBJECTHOOD
Olfaction is a process that produces from volatile chemicals 
in the external world a perceptual impression that sometimes 
links to concepts (“cooked cabbage”) and, at other times, 
seems to lack a distinctly descriptive character (what is that 
smell?). It is quite common to describe smells with respect 
to their associated source objects. Still, in the words of 
Magritte, This is not a pipe. Odor labels are conceptual 
“proxies,” they should not be  taken for the real thing (i.e., 
a perfumer can create a perceptual image, such as apple, 
from various molecules which need not be  present in real 
apples). So we  are advised to question:
What is the output of the process of olfaction; more specifically, 
what defines the content of olfactory experience? An answer 
is hard to come by because olfactory responses do not appear 
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to be  stable but vary a lot, between people but also in the 
same individual. Its variability is the reason why olfaction has 
long been excluded from theories of perception. It is also the 
reason why philosophical interest in olfactory theories was 
framed around the chemical stimulus as the stable element 
in the stimulus-response equation (Lycan, 2000, 2014; Batty, 
2010a,b, 2013; Young, 2016; Millar, 2017). Here, the reasoning 
goes that if it can be  argued that odors are (1) rule-based 
representations of the stimulus, and (2) shown to be  constant, 
meaning perspective invariant, as well as (3) distinct in their 
elemental composition in comparison with other odors, then 
smells form perceptual objects.
Perceptual variability, on this account, is seen as distortions 
or illusions that occur when some factors interfere with the 
normal causal process of perceptual object formation. Hence, 
these variations are either special cases or deviations to 
be  “explained away.” The norm is stable object perception, as 
in vision. The following subsections challenge this ontological 
premise of odor objecthood in the current philosophical debate. 
Specifically, it is shown that perceptual variation in olfaction 
is not a mark of subjectivity or distortion. It is the hallmark 
of olfaction as a sensory system to facilitate its central function: 
namely, detecting changes in the chemical composition the 
environment, not a context-invariant representation of an object 
(Köster et  al., 2014; Barwich, 2018).
Variability is not the same as subjectivity (i.e., as having 
no objective measure) because variation in olfactory perception 
has an objective basis in the mechanisms of odor coding. Of 
course, this statement about objectivity as grounded in the 
sensory coding mechanisms applies to vision as well. Indeed, 
some variation also occurs in visual perception. That said the 
causal grounds and effects differ. Variation in vision routinely 
relates to higher-order processing. Consider the recent social 
media phenomenon of “the dress,” which was perceived as 
having different color combinations; people either saw it as 
being blue and black or white and gold. This effect is not 
related to visual receptor coding or sensitivities but linked to 
the computation of visual input in central processing. (Although, 
as a reviewer pointed out, there is suggestive evidence that 
this phenomenon may also relate to coding at the periphery; 
Rabin et  al., 2016. Indeed, such shared grounds of variability 
should invite us to rethink the principles of vision.)
Still, at the periphery, the visual system is striking stable, 
discrete, and invariant in its conditions of feature extraction 
and integration. Meanwhile, the opposite is true in olfaction, 
as the following sections illustrate. In addition to higher-level 
integration and top-down effects (also known in vision), olfaction 
is highly variable and lacks discrete feature extraction as well 
as coordinated feature integration already at the periphery in 
receptor coding (different from vision). This difference results 
in numerous effects of perceptual variation that are not 
accommodated by the notion of objecthood as derived from 
theories of vision.
Stimulus Representation
How do molecules result in mental images? Philosophical debate 
about olfactory objecthood centers on the chemical stimulus 
for its analysis of odor objects. Most have argued that odors 
can be  accommodated under a physicalist account: just like 
color is said to correlate with physical features, the visible 
spectrum, odors correspond to molecular features (Lycan, 2000; 
Young, 2016; Millar, 2017). However, any stimulus-response 
model – regardless of modality – must be  measured against 
the conditions of the sensory system.
There are two responses to a comparison of light and odor 
chemistry for stimulus-response models. First, such naive 
physicalism does not hold in color vision either (Matthen, 
2005; Chirimuuta, 2015). Not all colors have a physical 
expression in wavelength. Consider pink, which is a computation 
of the brain (“white light minus green light”), not directly a 
feature of the world. Second, olfaction does not work like 
vision in its coding. Such coding differences are vital when 
it comes to the question of odor object formation. A comparison 
of visual with odor coding must address two issues in this 
context: what is the causal disposition of the chemical stimulus, 
and how does the stimulus interact with the sensory system 
(i.e., receptor coding).
Starting with the stimulus, the visual stimulus behaves in 
a predictable fashion: reflections of light rays in edge-detection 
have a precise angle. The same cannot be  said about the 
chemical stimulus of smell: odorants are unpredictable in their 
environmental trajectory. What about the predictability of the 
coded molecular features in smell? Here, a comparison with 
color vision illuminates the difference. Color vision is low 
dimensional: it is determined by one key parameter, the length 
of electromagnetic waves. Meanwhile, odorants are multi-
dimensional; they are characterized by about 5,000 molecular 
parameters (Keller and Vosshall, 2016).
Odor chemistry is strikingly complex. The olfactory stimulus 
is structurally highly irregular in how its molecular features 
link to specific perceptual effects. Minimal alterations in 
chemical composition, sometimes just of one carbon atom 
or methyl group, can result in substantive qualitative shifts 
(Rossiter 1996; Sell, 2006). Similarity in chemical structure 
does not necessitate similar odor quality: consider isosteric 
molecules, which are almost identical in shape and structure, 
yet have different odors. In contrast to the visual system, 
olfactory quality is not reducible to a linear stimulus-response 
model. This applies to individual odorants. It is rendered 
even more visible in mixture perception.
Commonly we  do not perceive the smell of single odorants 
but mixtures. Molecules in a mixture regularly change their 
chemical properties and behavior, sometimes unpredictably. 
Unlike light in vision, the causal disposition of the olfactory 
stimulus can alter. Mixture perception does not operate by 
neat additive principles of stimulus combination. Consider 
coffee aroma, which consists of several hundred of chemicals. 
None of these elements, in isolation, smells of coffee. Many 
of these individual components have a robust individual odor, 
such as indole with its overpowering fecal scent. In coffee 
aroma, this fecal smell is not present but blends with the 
other components to form a qualitatively new aroma. Odor 
chemistry involves several other effects involved in the masking 
and blending of aromatic compounds.
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There is much more to be  said about stimulus chemistry, 
of course. Suffice to say, the computation of odor from molecular 
structure is not straightforward. Its solution remains unresolved, 
if not debatable in light of recent receptor studies (Poivet 
et  al., 2016, 2018). The interaction with the receptors are what 
really determines the causal disposition of the stimulus in 
relation to the sensory system, meaning what kinds of information 
the sensory system is able to pick up and process. This brings 
us to the system selecting the input.
The biology of olfaction is not less complicated. It involves 
receptor coding as well as the organization of neural activity. 
This article will focus primarily on receptor biology for brevity 
(analysis of the neural organization of odor signaling in 
Barwich, 2018). The receptors alone give us plenty to talk about.
Differences to vision emerge immediately. The coding of 
primary colors, a central notion in visual perception, derives 
from the tuning of the three cones. To put this into perspective, 
human olfaction employs about 400 different receptor types. 
This contrast in number is not the only remarkable feature 
of the olfactory system. Olfactory receptors are also governed 
by different coding principles than vision.
Odor receptors operate by combinatorial coding and are 
highly variable in their tuning to molecular features. 
Combinatorial coding means that one receptor recognizes 
different features of different odorants; conversely, one odorant 
can be  detected by several receptors (Malnic et  al., 1999). In 
terms of tuning, some odor receptors detect a broader range 
of features and odorants than others (Poivet et al., 2016, 2018). 
What that means is that analogies to color vision break down: 
there is no set of primary smells coded by a set of receptors 
that, in their combination, explain the composition of other 
smells. Instead, there is a smorgasbord of possible olfactory 
stimuli and qualities (stimulus estimates range up to one trillion; 
Bushdid et  al., 2014).
Back to the subject of odor object formation, these two 
factors (the mechanism of combinatorial coding, as well as 
variations and range in receptor tuning) carry two significant 
consequences for the perception of odor:
 1.  Combinatorial coding explains the vast amount of odors 
we  can perceive, including the fact that we  detect entirely 
new smells – immediately. It does not matter to the nose 
whether it encounters a molecule known to our ancestors, 
or an odorant created by a chemist in a laboratory 5  min 
ago. Your nose does not have to evolve a new set of 
receptors to do this. It picks up distinct features (e.g., the 
polar surface area of a molecule), which can occur in 
countless chemical permutations and is encoded by endless 
molecular combinations by the sensory system. For the 
identification of odor objects that means that there are 
odorants that did not exist in nature and have a quality 
that no human has smelled before, and which cannot 
be  explained by reference to other odorants. In contrast 
with color coding, we  cannot say: “Oh, the odor of this 
stimulus is computed as cis-3-hexenol minus hedione.”). 
Plus, these odorants may not have any known semantic 
object associated with them (like pee or rose). So, odor 
object coding must be  understood in terms of receptor 
behavior. But receptor coding does not allow for 
straightforward stimulus-response mapping because:
 2.  Unlike vision, where the three cones are uniformly tuned 
to specific wavelengths, odor receptor coding is not uniform. 
Each of the 400 receptors operates by a different receptive 
range, its own receptor chemistry. The resulting causal mosaic 
of stimulus-receptor coding in olfaction makes it impossible 
to map stimulus activity (as represented by the sensory 
system) directly onto distinct features of physical stimulus 
space (Poivet et al., 2016, 2018). One could argue that vision 
also operates in a combinatorial way across the color cones 
(to facilitate the calculation of colors without an associated 
spectrum, like pink). However, there exists a crucial difference 
between vision and olfaction in their mechanism of 
combinatorial coding. In color vision, all photoreceptors 
respond to the same stimulus property, wavelength, while 
the olfactory receptors respond to about 5,000 different 
parameters in a non-linear, non-additive fashion (e.g., 
hydrophobicity, molecular weight, stereochemistry, volatility, 
etc.) (Ohloff et  al., 2011). Consequently, feature extraction 
in olfaction is not homogenous; an issue highly relevant 
for signal integration and the question: which stimulus 
feature does a neural signal propagating receptor activation 
actually stand for?
What this difference amounts to is that, ultimately, odor 
qualities are determined by the constitution and coding of the 
receptors, not the chemical topology of the stimulus. It is 
worth highlighting here that experiments comparing stimulus 
chemistry with receptor behavior in the classification of odorants 
revealed significant differences in odorant grouping (Poivet 
et  al., 2016, 2018). In other words: olfactory receptors arrange 
the chemical similarity of odorants by different features than 
an analytical chemist would model these molecules. The difference 
is fundamental; Poivet et  al. (2018) showed that receptors 
responded to and grouped odorants by features that were not 
predicted by traditional stimulus chemistry (Keller et al., 2017). 
Stimulus coding at the receptor level is not coextensive with the 
chemical topology of the distal stimulus.
In further consequence, it is anything but apparent that 
olfaction affords a position of representationalism. Philosophical 
hand-waiving to “microstructure,” as the material basis for 
stimulus representation, does not lend plausibility to the question 
of olfactory objecthood. It is the receptors that count, not the 
stimulus. And the receptors do not afford a direct mapping 
of odor quality to molecular structure.
This view becomes indisputable once we  take a closer look 
at receptor genetics. Receptor genetics is one of the central 
causes for variation in olfactory responses. With a few exceptions, 
people typically have the same set of visual cones. Olfaction 
is different. Each person has a unique expression of receptor 
patterns in their nose, by default. Does that imply that individual 
noses also smell the world differently? It looks that way! Recent 
studies linked the genetic diversity in odor receptors to variations 
in perceptual responses (Keller et al., 2007; Trimmer et al., 2019). 
On top of that, the vast number of olfactory receptor genes 
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in the human genome allows for many mutations to take effect. 
Such mutations lead to notable differences in the experience 
of odor. For instance, cilantro (coriander) is intensely disliked 
by some people, who perceive its aldehydes as soapy and 
pungent instead of fruity and green. This perceptual effect 
stems from a genetic mutation near the olfactory receptor 
gene OR6A2 (Eriksson et  al., 2012).
Next to differences in stimulus behavior, receptor coding 
and genetics, is receptor sensitivity. There are many odorants 
whose perception can vary substantially depending on receptor 
sensitivity. Take androstenone, a pig pheromone (Wysocki and 
Beauchamp, 1984). Androstenone smells differently to people 
with varying receptor sensitivities. Some people find it smells 
unpleasantly like urine, others perceive it as sweaty like body 
odor, and to others, it appears as woody, to a few it even 
comes off as vanilla or floral. Frankly, it is meaningless to ask 
whose perception is “accurate” or a correct representation. It 
is not a matter of subjectivity either, as this perceptual divergence 
grounds in distinct, measurable causal differences. These are 
only some examples of how biology, not isolated stimulus 
chemistry, determines odor perception.
What if we  understood stimulus representation in terms of 
receptor patterns, instead of odor chemistry? This strategy was 
pursued by Batty (2010a,b) and, to some extent, Millar (2017) 
(conflating receptor coding with stimulus topology). Batty and 
Millar referenced Wilson and Stevenson’s (2006) biological 
definition of odor objects via receptor activation. Even in this 
modified account, the criterion of stimulus representation collapses. 
To explain this, it matters to disentangle the scientific notion 
of odor object from the philosophical concept. Wilson and 
Stevenson’s definition does not link odor objects as receptor 
patterns directly to perceptual categories (skunk, pee, and apple). 
The scientific use of odor object refers to the neural signals as 
the target of scientific explanation. Odor objects as receptor 
patterns determine the composition of the neural signal projected 
and organized throughout central processing by the olfactory 
system. This scientific notion is not co-extensive with the 
philosophical concept of odor object as defined above. (Additionally, 
Wilson and Stevenson emphasized the need to consider context-
dependence in processes of learning, instead of stable stimulus-
response coding, as the basis of olfactory perception.)
Identifying odor objects in the philosophical sense with 
combinatorial receptor patterns leads to conceptual pseudo-
problems. Say, the epithelium of one person (P1) expresses 
four of five receptors coding for a specific odorant like hedione, 
while another person (P2) has all five. Do they perceive the 
same olfactory object? If not, the notion of odor object for 
the criterion of stimulus representation breaks down. If yes, 
we  are ending up with a biological version of Theseus’ ship. 
Say, P1 expresses four of six receptors coding for an odorant 
{1 2, 3, 4}, while P2 also has four receptors but not the same 
set as P1, either {1, 2, 3, 5} or {1, 2, 5, 6}. Do they perceive 
the same olfactory object in this case? Moreover, does only 
one of these two options have the same odor object, or both, 
or neither? Such game of definitions could be  played ad 
absurdum without ever arriving at real insights into the nature 
of odor perception or objecthood.
One may object that what counts is stability within rather 
than across individuals. However, individuals undergo alterations 
in their receptor repertoire, too. Receptor expression patterns 
do change during an individual’s lifetime with changes in 
exposure to odorants (Jones et  al., 2008). This is not the case 
in vision.
The upshot is that variability in perceptual responses is not 
necessarily an expression of subjectivity, but mirrors the causal 
mechanisms of the olfactory system. Variations in sensory 
coding determine and explain deviations in perceptual content. 
What constitutes objectivity in perception, therefore, are the 
causal principles of the system, not philosophical armchair 
intuitions about stimulus representation. Variation is not to 
be  explained away as it constitutes the fundamental modus 
operandi of the olfactory system.
Perceptual Constancy
The ability to recognize and identify particular objects through 
time and space is perhaps the most convincing or intuitive 
criterion of perceptual objecthood. Its effects are salient in 
vision. The brain is an extraordinary organ in how it makes 
sense of visual input hitting the retina from all sorts of angles 
and constructing a tractable image that exhibits a constancy 
of features across changing perspectives and lighting 
circumstances. Next to variations of perspective are other 
challenges to visual processing; e.g., we  can identify visual 
objects even if they are partially occluded, part of elaborate 
scenery, or distorted in some features.
This understanding of perceptual constancy applies to olfaction 
in Millar’s (2017) view: “we require more than a mere moment-
by-moment individuation of odours; we also need these odours 
to retain their identity across change (involving object recognition 
capacities.” Millar’s central argument for perceptual constancy 
as a criterion for olfactory objecthood is that “[w]e experience 
odors as discrete units that bear properties and retain their 
identities through perspectival change.” Millar differentiates 
between two types of perceptual constancy: on the one hand, 
we see objects as “complete,” meaning we can identify perceptual 
objects even if some of their physical features are occluded. 
On the other hand, we  can detect invariant features of a 
perceptual object despite shifts in perspective. These types of 
constancy imply that there are specific causal features that 
ensure stability in the mental representation of odor objects.
The problem with Millar’s argument is that it starts with 
an incorrect premise. Odors do not have a discrete identity 
retained throughout various perspectives, sensory and cognitive. 
Three examples should hammer this point home.
First, there is the mechanism of selective adaptation in 
olfaction (Hettinger and Frank, 2018). Prolonged exposure to 
an odor, especially of complex mixtures, alters one’s perception 
of its quality. The reason for that is, again, receptor behavior. 
Odor receptors habituate quickly to a stimulus. Moreover, 
olfactory receptors habituate and desensitize at different speeds. 
So if one smells an odor blend for a while, the receptors get 
desensitized to some of its stronger ingredients while others, 
to which receptors are still responsive, become more prominent 
in return. So, it is not clear what Millar alludes to as 
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“discrete units.” (Selective adaptation is a serious impediment 
for olfactory psychophysics; a challenge visual scientists are 
lucky not having to deal with: You  can expose a subject to 
a visual stimulus repeatedly, for several minutes, without fearing 
that this will affect what colors or shapes they perceive.) Even 
the sequence in which you  administer odorants affects their 
perception: your perception of a cherry odor will exhibit a 
smoky note if you  were exposed to a smoky odor beforehand, 
but not if you  smelled the cherry odorant first (Cooke and 
Myin, 2011). One may object that in some cases at least (like 
the cherry one), the odor is still conceptually the same by 
presenting variations of a common theme (“cherry” plus 
something else). In reply, consider the next case.
Second, an olfactory mixture can, when perceived under 
altering perspectives, be  experienced as having different 
conceptual categories. In a study by Herz and von Clef (2001), 
participants smelled identical pairs of five mixtures, each 
administered with different verbal labels (e.g., “parmesan” and 
“vomit” for butyric acid, or “musty basement” and “incence” 
for Patchouli). Subjects reported that the mixtures smelled 
different, although each pair of vials contained the same 
stimulus. The same stimulus can elicit a markedly different 
phenomenological experience, as well as qualitative category, 
depending on changes in the context of its exposure. Different 
semantic associations result in diverging perceptions of the 
same stimulus simply by experiencing an odor with a different 
conceptual tag. Indeed, descriptions of an odor vary significantly 
if a source object is visible or not; a fact that the German 
psychologist Hans Henning recognized as early as 1916 (Henning, 
1916). Still, one may object to the example of Herz and von 
Clef (2001): since participants were not aware that these pairs 
were identical, they were simply “fooled” by the verbal labels. 
A third case will dissolve also this objection.
In a presentation at Columbia University in 2017, the master 
perfumer Christophe Laudamiel distributed smelling strips 
scented with sulfurol to an audience. People smelling it at 
first were uncertain regarding its quality. It smelled somewhat 
organic, perhaps a little meaty or sweaty, but also of something 
else. Laudamiel proceeded to show an image of warm milk. 
The audience murmured in agreement. Of course, it smelled 
like warm milk! Laudamiel continued by showing another 
image, this time of ham. The audience was startled. The strip 
with sulfurol suddenly smelled like ham. Laudamiel repeated 
his demonstration, alternating between the images of warm 
milk and ham. The perceptual switch continued to occur with 
the alternating images. The moral of the story is that, yes, 
we  can recognize and assign a stimulus with general classes 
of odor qualities (like milk or ham). But the mere fact that 
our sensory system facilitates perceptual categorizations of input 
information does not mean that there is a discrete and constant 
perceptual object assigned to a stimulus.
In contrast with color vision, the border separating sensory 
input from cognitive judgment appears less categorical in smell 
than in vision. One reason for this is that the same olfactory 
stimulus, in different contexts, alters its perceptual meaning. 
Butyric acid can be  perceived as Parmesan as well as vomit 
because it is an element of both, Parmesan and vomit aroma. 
Odor signals are ambiguous and underdetermined with respect 
to the conceptual identity of their source objects. This ambiguity 
resides on the periphery and does not constitute higher-level 
effects of illusions, distortions, or bias. Instead, variation in 
olfaction is explained by receptor coding and stimulus behavior 
in the environment. On the one hand, receptor coding: unlike 
visual cones, the olfactory receptors do not have a consistent, 
designated receptive range that picks out this, only this, and 
no other feature. Instead, they are broadly tuned and 
combinatorial. The signal the brain “sees” is only receptor 
activity in response to odorants, which may stem from several 
types of source objects. On the other hand, stimulus behavior: 
the stimulus itself is promiscuous in its occurrence; odorants 
frequently overlap in their occurrence in different mixtures 
and environments, so much so that they can get associated 
with various source objects of distinctly different conceptual 
identities. Therefore, odor identification is not poor (as argued 
by Young, 2018); it is conceptually underdetermined.
In conclusion, odors are not perspective-invariant like visual 
objects. Olfactory processing, in light of its inherent sensory 
underdetermination at the periphery, is fundamentally shaped 
by other sensory and higher-level cognitive processes (e.g., 
cross-modal cues, verbal descriptors, selective attention, or the 
mood of the perceiver).
Let us finish this section by applying these insights into 
odor biology to the criterion of perceptual constancy, as 
outlined in Millar (2017). Take the first type of perceptual 
constancy: completeness. It is not obvious what it even means 
for an olfactory object to be  “complete.” Millar thinks of 
the unified experience of an odor. However, a complex, 
unified experience is not indicative of discrete perceptual 
objects (or migraines would meet that criterion; can a migraine 
be  complete?). Plus, a unified sensory experience does not 
entail object recognition and identification. Otherwise, people 
would not struggle with identifying even familiar odors (the 
so-called “tip of the nose phenomenon” in Engen, 1991). In 
fact, integrated perceptual experience and object recognition 
(and identification) reflect distinct processing stages (also in 
vision, think agnosia).
The main point in need of attention is the second type of 
perceptual constancy: that perceptual objects have invariant 
features that allow them to be  viewpoint independent. The 
reason why olfaction does not offer viewpoint independent 
perception is plain yet cannot be  stressed enough: its coding 
differs from vision.
Consider how perceptual constancy is achieved in vision. 
Crucial to stimulus coding in the visual system is spatial 
representation (Hubel, 1988; Tootell et  al., 1988). In parallel 
with the distinctly spatial coding of retinal input and its 
cortical projections, the perceptual representation of visual 
objects builds on specific spatial features, such as edges and 
boundaries, orientation, directionality, and extension 
(Churchland, 1989). Specifically, shape detection in vision 
builds on particular viewpoint invariant features in edge-
detection, such as T-junctions defining the boundaries of 
objects and Y-junctions marking areas where surfaces join 
(Oram and Perrett, 1994). Based on these junctions, our visual 
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system can calculate regularities in perspective, e.g., in the 
reconstruction of parallel structures. Optical illusions routinely 
build on this peculiarity in visual processing (e.g., the Ames 
room). In effect, the possibility of viewpoint invariant spatial 
features in vision is a result of the topographically distinct 
projection of signals from retinal cells sensitive to light contrast 
(center-surround cells) to cells in the primary visual cortex 
(and their hierarchical integration from simple cells to more 
complex cells) (Hubel, 1988).
What kinds of features are extracted by the olfactory system 
that might allow for feature-invariant representation? Feature 
extraction in edge-detection, as well as color vision, is much 
more confined and discrete compared to olfactory receptor 
tuning and combinatorics. In odor coding, there is no single 
definite parameter (like light contrast in edge-detection, or 
wavelength in color vision) that could operate as a viewpoint 
invariant feature. In a sense, the olfactory brain has to do 
some guesswork because odor receptors respond to several 
kinds of features as they are broadly tuned. Say, a receptor 
can be  tuned to molecules with a particular polar surface area 
as well as odorants with atom groups in a specific orientation 
or a functional group (e.g., thiols). The interpretation of such 
underdetermined input signal thus depends on other, parallel 
signals. On a neural level, feature coding is not viewpoint 
invariant either.
Additionally, the neural representation of odors differs 
fundamentally from the topographic organization in vision. 
Over the past decade, it transpired that the olfactory cortex, 
specifically the piriform cortex, does not operate by a topographic 
principle similar to edge-detection (or even perceptual color 
maps) in the visual system (Stettler and Axel, 2009; Chen 
et  al., 2014; Barwich, 2018). While research on rodents has 
shown temporal patterns associated with odors to emerge in 
the piriform (Roland et  al., 2017), these patterns differ from 
the neural principles of the visual cortex: piriform patterns 
are sparse and require targeted, conditioned exposure to odorants; 
they are transient; and they are non-topographic and 
non-stereotypic. Thus, they represent contingent neural 
associations with an odor, not constancy in the way the visual 
system facilitates perspective-invariant perception through 
consistent and stable feature coding.
Overall, olfaction lacks a principal feature by which to 
calculate regularities or parallel structures like in vision, and 
as required for perceptual constancy if understood as perspectival 
invariance. In olfaction, we  do not have a comparable set-up 
in its coding principles. While the olfactory system facilitates 
perceptual categorizations of stimulus information, it does not 
provide a comparable invariance in feature coding like edge-
detection in vision. Notably, this applies also to the olfactory 
bulb, not only piriform cortex. The olfactory bulb is not a 
stereotypical but developmentally induced structure (Zou et al., 
2009; also Belluscio et  al., 2002; Feinstein et  al., 2004). In 
even more exciting news, Noam Sobel has just reported a 
finding that “4.5% of all left-handed women in the #HCP 
data base have a perfectly normal sense of smell, but no 
olfactory bulb” (2019 meeting of the Association for 
Chemoreception Sciences, NeuroVero, 2019). While the 
implications of this finding are yet to be  determined, clear is 
that this may revise understanding of odor coding and further 
differentiate it from vision.
Ultimately, the process of categorization (lumping information 
into groups) does not require the notion of objecthood.
Figure-Ground Segregation
Figure-ground segregation allows the perceiver to pick out 
specific information against a noisy background. The cocktail 
party effect, referring to instances when one can hear someone 
saying their name in a chattering crowd, is an example of 
how the brain can filter and prioritize auditory information 
(Cherry, 1953). Olfaction, too, allows for figure-ground 
segregation. Smelling wine aroma, e.g., we  can discern the 
presence of a light vanilla note against its general aromatic 
bouquet. Notwithstanding, Keller (2017) highlighted that there 
is an essential distinction in figure-ground segregation between 
vision and olfaction, one that further resonates with the argument 
on odor coding in the previous section: “Unlike visual perception, 
olfactory perception does not have a figure-background structure 
that reflects the relative position of stimuli in physical space.” 
The foregrounding of specific odor notes in wine aroma does 
not represent the arrangement of components in physical 
stimulus space.
Figure-ground segregation in olfaction has to do with stimulus 
saliency. Sommeliers evaluate a wine by focusing on distinct 
criteria of observational likeness with other wine profiles. (They 
can point to subtle flavor notes that the layperson may have 
missed but, after paying attention, is also able to perceive.) 
Olfactory experts can “dissect” a complex olfactory mixture 
in its qualitative notes as a result of extensive training and 
selective attention (Smith, 2007, 2017a; Croijmans and Majid, 
2016; Barwich, 2017). During this process, wine tasters, as 
well as perfumers for that matter, have to search for olfactory 
qualities in a complex mixture. They are taking several steps 
of sniffing, comparing and evaluating their perception against 
cognitive templates because these fragrant notes in complex 
mixtures do not reveal themselves all at once (Smith, 2007; 
Todd, 2010). Figure-ground segregation in odor perception is 
not immediate; it is a process of perceptual grouping that 
involves sequential processing of attention and iterative 
interpretation. To be  good at wine tasting requires perceptual 
expertise, acquired by a prolonged training of particular 
perceptual grouping techniques. Essentially, this expertise builds 
on the disposition to separate sensory information and focus 
on salient features. This principle of perceptual grouping likewise 
applies to naïve (untrained) smellers, who have to learn to 
assign perceptual classes and meanings to olfactory stimuli in 
order to form context-sensitive associations (Wilson and 
Stevenson, 2006; Köster et  al., 2014; Barwich, 2018). – Test 
it yourself with wine tasting kits!
Essentially, figure-ground segregation is a process that 
facilitates perceptual categorization, not perceptual objecthood. 
A distinction introduced by Smith (2007) explains this difference. 
Smith, using the example of taste, distinguishes between, on 
the one hand, the causal disposition of a stimulus to elicit a 
certain (range of) perceptual qualities and, on the other hand, 
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the perceptual expression of said causal features as a phenomenal 
quality. This distinction is crucial for understanding olfaction 
because the perceptual expression of an odor does not correlate 
undeviatingly with the causal disposition of its stimulus: First, 
the same stimulus can elicit different qualitative experiences 
in individuals (e.g., based on genetic differences). Second, a 
complex stimulus can be  perceived differently in its qualitative 
notes if perceivers group its features differently. For example, 
two wine critics may describe the bouquet of a wine in separate 
qualitative terms simply because different features in the wine 
appear salient to them in their perceptual evaluation, and so 
they pay attention to different olfactory notes in their 
characterization (Smith, 2017a,b). That does not make the wine 
different. They might even come to the same conclusion 
(identifying the specific type of wine, its vineyard and year). 
But their perceptual sequence of evaluating the wine may differ. 
On this account, figure-ground segregation can result in varying 
yet equally accurate perceptual groupings of the same stimulus.
PERCEPTUAL CATEGORIZATION IN 
DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES
It is instructive to think of perceptual object formation as just 
one example of how the senses act as perceptual systems. Some 
sensory systems may afford the formation of perceptual objects. 
But that does not say that the notion of perceptual objecthood 
is fundamental to the process of sensory perception in every 
modality. Rather, perception operates by the two principal processes 
of discrimination (same or different) and categorization (grouping 
of features). The coding of perceptual objecthood constitutes a 
special case in perceptual processing. Perceptual objecthood, if 
understood as stimulus representation linked to perceptual 
constancy, seems to require distinct coding principles at the 
periphery. The predominant focus on vision covered up the fact 
that object formation in this sense is not instantiated equally in 
other sensory systems, not even in all exteroceptive senses.
In this context, this article demonstrated that olfaction does 
not fit the three criteria of perceptual objecthood in philosophical 
debate. The olfactory pathway revealed to rely on substantially 
different coding principles in comparison to the visual system. 
This article analyzed these coding differences in their impact 
on perceptual content formation and expression. In particular, 
the high variability in the perceptual experience of odors was 
shown not to be  a matter of distortion but how the olfactory 
system operates in its processes of feature extraction, combination, 
and integration. Perceptual analysis was shown to fail if it 
excludes the specifics of the sensory system.
To conclude, odors need not form a perceptual object to 
display general categories in their perception and for the 
olfactory system to fulfill its proper role. If one considers how 
robustly processes of learning, expectation, and cross-modal 
cues shape content formation in olfaction (Smith, 2012, 2017a; 
Barwich, 2018), it is clear that the olfactory system facilitates 
general categorizations of input without being built to represent 
perspective invariant objects in the same way as vision.
What primarily drives olfactory perception is not discrete, 
stable odor object formation but context-sensitive decision-making 
(Barwich, 2017, 2018). After all, the same chemical stimulus 
can occur in many different contexts, changing its causal disposition 
(e.g., in a mixture), as well as its meaning and value for the 
perceiver. It matters profoundly to the perceiver whether butyric 
acid is encountered as part of food (parmesan) or contaminants 
(vomit). The function of olfaction is to recognize changes in 
context and, in turn, affordance of the material stimulus (Barwich, 
2018). Therefore, the same physical information of a stimulus 
can be grouped differently and matched against various cognitive 
templates. Its perceptual expression must be examined accordingly. 
Upon encountering olfactory information, the brain essentially 
has to decide on the grouping, salience, and value of olfactory 
input by matching this information with learned templates of 
odor categorization and other cues (cross-modal, verbal), all 
indicating the context in which a decision about the incoming 
olfactory information takes place.
Processes of perceptual categorization, as decision-making, 
do not to require the notion of olfactory objecthood. Smell 
is intentional in the sense that it provides information about 
materials in the world. Its content, however, is not a perceptual 
expression of olfactory objects but of grouping sensory input 
into qualitative classes. How perceptual categories are formed 
is the real question that scientific and philosophical theories 
of olfaction must tackle next.
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